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Justice William 0. Douglas: The Constitution in a
Free Society
WILLIAM M. BEANEY*
It is not easy to assess the significance of William 0. Douglas'
career as as associate justice from 1939 to 1975 because he has been
such an extraordinary public figure off the bench. Judges in general,
and state supreme court justices in particular, are expected to be rather
conservative, relatively colorless persons. Their public and private lives
are supposed to be humdrum and circumspect. Clearly, Justice Douglas
was not cast in this mold. Beginning with his youthful trip by railroad
freight cars from his home in Yakima, Washington to law school at
Columbia until the very end of his term on the Court, he was on numer-
ous occasions an outspoken advocate of ideas and a supporter of causes
that aroused controversy.' In both his public and private life he insisted
on being his own man, unfettered by judicial conventions.
There was little in his early activities after graduation from
Columbia Law School to suggest the controversial nature of his career
after appointment to the Supreme Court in 1939 by Franklin D. Roose-
velt. He practiced law briefly in the huge Cravath Firm in New York,
and subsequently in his native Yakima, Washington. He then taught
at Columbia, moved to Yale, and quickly became identified as a prominent
member of the realist school of jurisprudential thought, with a special
interest in the interrelationships between law and business. He left Yale
for a position with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934,
was appointed a member in 1936, and chairman in 1937. While thought
to be antibusiness when appointed chairman, he quickly developed good
relations with the business world and, at the time of his appointment
to the Court, was criticized chiefly for being too friendly towards Wall
Street.
Douglas' career on the Supreme Court was an unusual blend of
two roles-that of a national and international public figure and that
of an associate justice. We must summarize his non-judicial actions and
writings in a few words. He spoke out on domestic and international
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issues, traveled frequently abroad and spoke on world problems, called
and marched for reforms in environmental and other areas, climbed
mountains, fell off horses, flirted with politics in the 1940's, and wrote
endlessly on a variety of subjects, both legal and non-legal. What he
did, said, and wrote provoked public criticism and led to attempts in
Congress, including one by then Congressman Gerald R. Ford, to in-
voke the impeachment process. Nor was his private life exempt from
criticism, commonly by those in and out of government who found his
ideology and judicial pronouncements distasteful.
Although Justice Douglas did not fully embrace the libertarian
role for which he is best known at the very outset of his judicial career,
his concern for minorities and dissenters became his most famous judi-
cial contribution. In 1940, in the Minersville v. Gobitis' case, he was a
member of the Court majority which voted to uphold a state flag salute
requirement. Three years later he recanted.' He had some wavering
moments with respect to church-state issues between 1947 and 1962,'
but finally became a supporter of total separation. His original view
that obscenity was not protected by the first amendment was replaced
by one that disdained a censorship role for the Court.' With but few
exceptions his philosophy was dominated by a deep commitment to
protecting individual and group liberties. While acknowledging the
necessity for state or federal regulation of certain business practices,
and of government intervention to assist those who were victims of
social and economic distress, Justice Douglas feared and opposed big
government and its intrusive bureaucratic ways. Many of his opinions
reflected fears that bureaucratic agencies were oppressing weak individ-
uals. He wanted the Court to accept more cases involving apparent
injustices to individuals who were ill-prepared to help themselves.6
2 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
3 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4 Compare his position in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) with his strong advocacy of total separation in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (concurring opinion).
S In his dissent in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (dissenting opin-
ion), he regarded obscene publications as undeserving of first amendment protection. He
later advocated total freedom for publications in A Book, etc. v. Attorney-General, 383
U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (Fanny Hill case) (concurring opinion). In 1973 he called attention
to his rejection of his earlier view that the first amendment did not protect commercial
matter in publications. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 397 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
6 justice Douglas was the great dissenter from denials of certiorari. See the statistics
in Co?,rrss sozN ON DIvIsioN or TH FEDERAL COURT APPIELATE SvsTIm, REPoRT A-88
(1975). A large number of the cases involved individual rights.
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His faith in free speech and the democratic process was almost
boundless. As his dissent in Dennis v. United States" revealed, he feared
government censorship far more than the possible dangers from the
mouthings of Communist leaders. He feared the tyranny of legislatures
or administrative agencies, which in their quest for orthodoxy in views
and behavior frequently reflected a limited or corrupted version of
democracy. His theory of democratic action was conditioned by the
central position in his philosophy of the Bill of Rights. Popular action,
whatever its form, could take place only under the guidelines of the
Bill of Rights. Majority action was limited by the declared rights of
minorities. While rejecting natural law thinking, the combination in
his thought of the functional approach, which concentrated on the way
law affected people in the real world, and a heavy emphasis on the rights
of individuals frequently led to results that to some observers smacked
of a personal or intuitive response.
The fact that Justice Douglas was more than a practicing libertarian
has frequently been overlooked. He was expert in ratemaking and other
regulatory matters affecting business.' He had a keen sense of how
legislatures and administrative agencies operated and was unwilling to
express judicial deference where their actions harmed individuals. He
was alert to issues involving "invidious discrimination" in classifications,
as his opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma reveals.! While his discovery of
a right of privacy based on "emanations" and "penumbras" in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut"0 has been jeeringly received, it is hardly less "judi-
cial" than using "liberty" as a sponge for incorporating new rights into
the fourteenth amendment.
Perhaps the reason why younger people both within and without
the legal profession have regarded Justice Douglas more highly than
have their elders, is because he has always reflected a powerful concern
over the fate of the individual confronted by increasingly impersonal
governmental and business organizations. Individual rights and equality
of rights are to Justice Douglas the important weapons to use in any
fight against arbitrary laws and official actions. They are a necessary
supplement to the political process in which the late Justice Frankfurter
reposed total confidence. As Justice Douglas wrote in We the Judges,
7 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8 See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
9 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Skinner offers an early example of the "strict scrutiny" test in
equal protection cases.
10381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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"The Constitution is a compendium, not a code; a declaration of faith,
not a compilation of laws. '""
When future historians reflect on the era that ends with Justice
Douglas' retirement, surely his role in shaping the Constitution into a
more effective shield for the rights of individuals, and in stressing
the Bill of Rights as essential to the maintenance of a free society, will
give him a strong claim to a place in the gallery of outstanding American
jurists.
I IW. Dou uls, WE T JuDGEs 429 (1956).
